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ABSTRACT

Although this paper identifies the various reasons for project failure, it also highlights the principles and practices related to project success. The paper attempts to strike a positive note concerning steps to take to increase the probability of successful project implementation and to suggest more realistic attitudes and expectations toward project outcomes. Various reasons for project failure are discussed within 10 separate but not necessarily mutually exclusive categories. The first category deals with the database on which projects are designed. Sections follow on assumptions, externalities, communication and miscommunication, time and cost estimates and predictions, variables, corruption, probabilities, evaluation and measurement, and bureaucratization and goal displacement. Because the categories overlap and are highly interrelated, they are treated as equal in their effect or explanatory force regarding project failure. A 66-item reference list concludes the document. (YLB)

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Why development projects don't work as planned : pitfalls and "solutions"

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WHY DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS DON'T WORK AS PLANNED: PITFALLS AND "SOLUTIONS"

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PITFALLS

"First, development professionals do not know how to carry out an effective economic development program, either a big one or a small one. No one knows how - not the U.S. government, not the Rockefeller Foundation, not the international banks and agencies, not the missionaries. I don't know how. You don't know how. No one knows how. Second, we don't know that we don't know how." (Paddock, W. and Paddock, E., 1973, pp. 299-300).

The quotation above from the Paddock's 1973 book entitled: "We Don't Know How" aptly sets the stage for this paper. William and Elizabeth Paddock made their statement at the conclusion of a year long field research in Mexico and Central America in the late 1960's. Their investigation included some fifty projects which were selected as among the best by the agency officials under whose auspices they were conducted. The Paddock's stated intention was to produce a document based on successful

experience in a variety of projects which could become a useful guide for application elsewhere. Their unfortunate conclusion was that none of the projects had worked as planned.

Beginning somewhere in the early seventies, it became popular to document the failures of development projects both in the international and domestic arenas. This paper does not attempt to provide a compendium of project failures. One need go no farther than the local news stand or listen to the nightly newscast to understand that we live in a sea of failures, some very large, expensive and dangerous ones and others not so cataclysmic in nature. The spaceship Challenger explosion and the Chernobyl nuclear reactor melt down are two of the most current large scale failures. Smaller scale casse studies of development project failures are carried on a regular basis in The Development Communication Report published quarterly by the Clearing House on Development Communication.

Several authors have addressed the problems of project implementation and the failure to meet specified objectives. The evaluation literature abounds with articles and other material documenting project failure. A few citations from this extensive body of literature on the international and domestic fronts are provided below.

A number of authors including Eramus (1961, 1968); Brokensha and Hodge (1969); Speight (1973); and Holdcroft (1978);

have examined and written about the problems of community development in Third World countries. The Atlantic Monthly of April 1985 carries an article by Jack Shepherd which chronicles a number of failed aid projects in Africa, including those of the Soviet Union (Shepherd, 1985). In July 1985 the Wall Street Journal ran an eight piece series on failed development efforts in Africa. Dennis A. Rondinelli has observed that "Despite more than a quarter of a century of intensive experience with project investment, international funding institutions and ministries of less developed countries still report serious problems in project execution". (Rondinelli, 1976). Samuel Paul cites such authors as Grindel, Lele, Siffin and some United Nations reports which document the limited effectiveness and "dismal outcomes of several development projects" in the third world. He also refers to a wide variety of studies in the U.S. which have shown poor project outcomes. (Paul, 1982).

Mullen and Dumpson's Evaluation of Social Intervention reviews the findings of thirteen major social experiments as well as other social work interventions in the United States in which they say: "the effectiveness of professional social work intervention has been a matter of concern for at least forty years" One of the earliest experimental design studies of juvenile delinquency (the Cambridge-Somerville Youth Study) concluded that the incidence of delinquency had not been reduced

through treatment. Other studies show that psychotherapy treatment for neurotics is no more effective than no treatment at all (Mullen and Dumpson, 1972). In reporting on the Coleman report regarding the limited contribution of schools to education, Egon Guba states: "This conclusion is incredible ... it means, if true, that it makes little difference whether a teacher is good or bad, whether good or poor materials are available, or whether the school is a barn or a geodesic dome; students will learn about the same" (Guba, 1972).

Danziger and Weinberg observe that although a simple correlation between spending and the level of poverty obscures many complexities, nevertheless, it is clear that in spite of twenty years of increased spending the level of poverty hasn't declined very much. They say that education, employment and training programs have only shown marginal gains due in part to limited funding. These authors conclude that even with adequate funding the results would probably be the same because we still do not know how to improve the education and employment prospects of the poor. Income transfers were not a major component of the War on Poverty or Great Society programs but they have been responsible for the greatest rise in social spending and have been responsible for much of the limited declines in poverty, especially for the elderly. At the same time, income "transfers have not promoted self-sufficiency among the able-bodied poor, an

important goal of the poor and taxpayers alike." (Danziger and Weinberg, 1986). Largely forgotten perhaps is Moynihan's Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding about the difficulties faced in implementing community action programs throughout the U.S. (Moynihan, 1969).

The references above are a very small sampling of the written material one can find regarding failed projects and programs. This list could be extended almost indefinitely. Freeman (1980), has made the dreariest statement of all when he concluded that "most human resource, health improvement and social development programs - regardless of geographical location and sponsorship - have been misguided, misconceived, badly implemented and ineffective".

The contention of this paper is that most projects do not work as planned and that this is true of brick and morter projects as well as projects aimed at human, economic or social development. Futhermore, one shouldn't expect them to. One might go so far as to say that it isn't possible for projects to work as planned.

Although the paper attempts to explain the reasons why projects don't usually work as planned, it is not intended to be a message of doom and gloom. It is rather an attempt at attitude adjustment wherein we change our assumptions, expectations and definitions concerning project planning, implementation and

success. In addition to identifying the various reasons for project failure, the principles and practices related to project success are also identified. Thus, the paper attempts to strike a positive note concerning steps to take to increase the probability of successful project implementation and to suggest more realistic attitudes and expectations toward project outcomes.

The various reasons for project failure are discussed within ten separate but not necessarily mutually exclusive categories. The first category to be discussed has to do with the data base on which projects are designed. This is followed by sections on Assumptions, Externalities, Communication and Miscommunication, Time and Cost Estimates and Predictions, Variables, Corruption, Probabilities, Evaluation and Measurement and Bureaucratization and Goal Displacement. Because the categories overlap and are highly interrelated, they are treated as equal in their effect or explanatory force regarding project failure. The numbering system is simply for identification purposes; not for establishing a priority system.

I THE DATA BASE

Most projects are initially conceived of in terms of some problem to be alleviated, if not solved. This somewhat innocent

looking statement leads us directly into one of the basic and fundamental reasons why many projects fail to achieve their objectives. Lurking within this statement is the need to define what the problem is. The importance of problem definition lies in its corollary of problem solution. The "solution" lies within the definition of the problem. Thus, if you say people are hungry because food production is low then you are likely to conclude that the solution to hunger is to raise food production. On the other hand, it you say that the reason people are hungry is because they don't have enough money to purchase food, then you are likely to conclude that the solution to hunger is employment.

Problems are usually defined through a data base. One typical technique for doing this is the so-called "gap" analysis. This technique may take several forms but basically it simply describes and then contrasts a present situation with a more desirable one. The difference between the two situations equals the problem to be resolved. For example, if the current per capita food consumption is 1,600 calories and the desired level is 2,300 calories, then the problem is to raise daily food consumption by 700 calories. Unfortunately, the data base which constitutes the foundation for most projects is unreliable to an unknown degree. In many cases, data are incomplete and invalid. One does well to remember the much quoted observation, even if apocryphal, of the British economist, Sir Josiah Stamp who served

in England's Inland Revenue Department from 1896-1919, to wit: "The Government are very keen on amassing statistics. They collect them, add them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of these figures comes in the first instance from the village watchman, who just puts down what he damn pleases."

Polly Hill (1984) in commenting on official Third World statistics, has observed that data collectors often make uninspired guesses at answers to questionnaires or 'extract' answers "by resorting to many convolutions, blandishments and deceits". Furthermore, higher level administrators are not aware "that ground level workers are not necessarily the honest, professional, knowledgeable people with a real understanding of local conditions . . . but are commonly under-trained, lonely, under-supervised, overworked, ignorant, bored, underpaid strangers who may be forced into corruption- including collusion with respondents who have rightly persuaded them of the futility of their task".

Robert Kuttner (1985) cites two well known economists, namely, Oskar Morgenstern and Wassily Leontief with regard to the data bases used in industrial countries. Morgenstern points out that most economic statistics are unreliable because, for one thing, people responding to official questionnaires, often lie.

Also, economists often make use of second-hand data which are collected for purposes quite different than economic analysis - or, even worse, as Leontief says, most economic models don't make use of any data at all!

In summary, due to unreliable, incomplete, inaccurate or non- existent data bases, the first requirement of good project planning and problem definition is often not met.

II ASSUMPTIONS

Most projects, designed to serve people or to meet the needs of a given client population, are based on several sets of assumptions. One set of assumptions relates to the population to be served. Here the assumptions include what the people want and how the people will react to the offerings of the program or project. People are usually assumed to be rational decision makers who will act to maximize their economic benefit and further that the offerings of the program will be viewed as instrumental in achieving the clientele's objectives. Some economists have gone so far as to say that there is nothing wrong with the theory of economic rationality except for human perversity. Other theoreticians argue that if the world doesn't conform to the analytical models; then it is unfortunate for the world. Thus it would seem that there is some recognition that

people may not always act according to theoretical models but is spite of this, the assumptions of rational economic behavior persist.

Closely aligned with the rationality assumption is another one that assumes homogeneous or at least very similar reactions and behavior on the part of people in all communities or areas of the country. Following this assumption, the same services are made available to all program clientele regardless of their differences. Related to this is an assumption that all workers can deliver the services equally well if given the proper training. Rutman (1980) confirms Selznick's organization-paradox regarding the division of labor when he observes that personnel at different levels of the organization and delivery sites interpret the purpose of the program differently and thus perform in quite different ways. Community development practitioners are fond of saying that one of the most important tools of the trade is the personality of the practitioner. Insofar as this is true and different professionals interpret a program differently, it can result in the same program being offered differently in different locations depending who the practitioner is. As Rutman (1980) has shown, this sometimes results in the program not being delivered at all! According to Sarason (1972), all projects involve the creation of new settings or organizational structures. These need to be created within the traditional and

historical context of the local community. Planners he says, tend to assume identical structures for their projects and thus obtain quick take-offs and crash landings.

Assumptions usually go unnoticed and unchallenged until some astute observer or interest group brings them to light. Throughout the developing world and in industrial countries as well, most agricultural development projects have assumed that the main clientele was a male farmer. Programs were universally directed toward men, including those farm enterprises which only women perform! The "women in development" movement has been working hard to correct this assumption with varying degrees of success. A good deal of what happens in community development at the local level is done by women and yet this is still a male dominated profession. A study by Lackey and Burke (1984) showed that female membership in the Community Development Society had increased threefold between 1970 and 1980, but even at its peak female membership was only 21 per cent.

Another set of assumptions about the clientele assumes that the people have full faith and confidence in the change agents, usually government employees or voluntary agency employees, and will therefore listen to their advice. Also, planners may implicitly assume that the people have an interest in helping the country to meet its macroeconomic or other goals which may be contained in some overall plan. This latter assumption rests on

some other ones which relate to a sense of national identity and the desire to be of service to the larger community. All of these assumptions need to be challenged and carefully tested.

III EXTERNALITIES

A different set of assumptions relates to the environment within which the project operates. Will the environment be the same throughout all implementation phases or will it change? If changes are assumed, what direction will they take and what will be the magnitude of these changes? Some of the important variables which come into play in this area include such things as the stability of the government and its policies- this includes continuity of personnel involved in the project and the funding levels. The stability of the economy in its domestic and international dimensions, including such things as inflation, revenues, world prices and exchange rates also have to be assumed or the magnitude and direction of change estimated. Clearly, what is happening in Mexico today on the one hand due to the drop in oil process and what is happening today in the U.S. due to the federal deficit and the Graham-Rudman-Hollings balanced budget legislation severely restrict the implementation and funding of many projects. It might be useful to put a warning on all approved project documents to the effect that "personnel,

policies and funding may change without notice".

It is instructive to note that in estimating time requirements for projects in the Program Review Evaluation System (PERT), planners are advised to ignore events which happen infrequently such as fires, floods, hurricanes, etc. (Moder et al.,1983).

Another, and extremely important aspect of the environment within which projects operate is related to the cause and effect of the problem to be "solved". Freeman (1980) has tackled this issue and provided some cogent insights into the capacity of projects to produce positive results. Projects, he says, are aimed "at a narrow band of community members' life space". However, the problems being addressed are encased within an overall socio-political-cultural structure which acts to limit the effectiveness of narrowly targeted approaches. For example, if variables like poverty, family conditions, culture, environmental factors and corrupt values explain things such as juvenile delinquency and crime; then narrowly focused programs aimed,for example, at providing recreation, will not have much impact. If the social-economic-political environment is defective then projects can not be effective until these underlying causes are corrected. What this appears to be saying is that project planners are not giving sufficient attention to the causal analysis to understand the nature of the problem being observed.

Altschuld, et al.(1982) seem to agree and suggest that the explanation for this lack of causal analysis may lie in the cost and time required to perform this type of research. According to Cathie (1982) the high rate of project failure in the U.N.'s World Food Program is due in part to the inadequacy of pre-project appraisal. His calculations show that on average only 3.6 minutes are spent on examining and approving World Food Program projects. The urgency for action has given rise to the wise crack: "Don't just stand there; do something!; even if it's wrong". This has been countered by the Reagan administration program cutters with: "Don't just stand there; undo something!".

A commonly neglected part of the environment has to do with the reactions and opposition to the project from persons, organizations and interest groups who are not included or who see the program as detrimental in some way to their interests. Some of this my be a result of jealousy and part may be attributed to the wall known but often ignored proposition that projects have both benefits and costs within the community. The adverse consequences of projects and their distribution within the community are usually overlooked but they can result in unanticipated opposition and/or sabotage with serious effects on

project operations.

Not to be forgotten is the very important atsmosphere within which projects operate. When the economy is booming, when spirits are high, when optimism prevails and when the leadership of the country is behind the social development enterprise there tends to be an enormous amount of attention and resources given to the establishment of administrative mechanisms to solve identified problems. These approaches usually turn out to be short lived fads which have been characterized as solving problems by "throwing money at them". Part of the difficulty created by these overenthusiastic programs manned by zealous, usually young, professionals is the demand to be successful. This atmosphere sometimes results in pushing programs too hard, ignoring the realities and feedback from the constituents, giving excessive attention to the success stories, cutting corners and fudging the data to make the project look good to insure continued funding. One of the conclusions of the Rogers Commission investigating the space shuttle challenger disaster was that the schedule of flights was too difficult to maintain and thus some corners were cut.

On the other hand, when economies are in depression, or when attention is given to other priorities, such as the defense budget, then the atsmosphere isn't particularly conducive to funding large scale social development programs and project

failure is used as a weapon for the discontinuance of programs. In this atsmosphere, projects not only fail to achieve their objectives, they are killed.

IV COMMUNICATION AND MISCOMMUNICATION

"I know that you believe you understand what you think I said, but I am not sure you realize that what you heard is not what I meant".

What better way is there to introduce the problem of conveying meaning from one person, group, agency or institution to another? Historians will record and long debate what was actually said by America's President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Premier Mikhail Gorbachev at the now historic meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland in October, 1986. Fortunately, this communication gap has been recognized immediately thus providing an opportunity to arrive at some clarification and possible agreement. Unfortunately, in many other cases, these areas of confusion, lack of agreement, and misunderstanding are not detected until things go wrong and varying degrees of damage are done.

An example of communication gone awry was the diplomatic blunder committed by a contract interpreter carefully screened and selected by the State Department to translate President

Carter's 1977 news conference in Poland. When President Carter said he wanted to learn the opinions and desires of the Polish people it was translated to the effect that he desired the Poles carnally (Simon, 1980). A reference to the day he "left the United States" was rephrased as "the day I abandoned the United States." Some other translation problems are illustrated by some other material compiled by Laurie (1981) as reported in Harpers, May 1981. When Chevrolet introduced its Nova model into Latin America it was translated into Spanish as "No Va" which means: "it doesn't go". Apparently sales picked up after the name was changed to Caribe (Paul Simon as quoted by Laurie, 1981). "Body by Fisher" was translated in Flemish as "Corpse by Fisher". Schweppes Tonic Water in Italian gets treated as "bathroom water". In Chinese, "Come Alive with Pepsi" might well be translated to suggest that Pepsi will bring your ancestors back from the grave! Another interesting wrinkle was Colgate-Palmolive's toothpaste "Cue". This was given the proper translation in France, but unfortunately, "Cue" was also the name of a popular book on oral sex. An ad for laundry soap in Quebec was touted to produce clean genitals (Rose Hayden as quoted by Laurie, 1981). These examples serve to illustrate some of the difficulties inherent in transmitting ideas, words, and concepts from one language to another. However, the communication problem is not limited to the translation of words across languages.

"Oh, I didn't know that's what you meant" is an oft repeated phrase in English which tends to clear the air and expose a previous misunderstanding.

At the project level, all manner of difficulties can arise through faulty communication. A well known phenomenon is the change in meaning which messages take on as they pass through different channels or levels of an organization.

Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) cite an example of why a public health project in Peru failed to convince villagers to boil their water. After two years of efforts trying to convince housewives to boil their water only 11 of the 200 women adopted this practice. The analysis of this failure indicated that the boiling of water carried a social meaning within the culture which wasn't understood or appreciated by the public health educators. In this village, the boiling of water was associated with being ill. Only sick people ever boiled water, but this wasn't because of an understanding of germ theory. People boiled water because of a classification scheme which separates foods and liquids into "cold" and "hot" categories with attendant prescriptions about when to eat or drink them. "Cold" foods were thought to be bad when you were ill. Cold water is classified as a "cold" food. Thus, people boiled water to make it less "cold", not to kill germs. Tradition dictated that well people should not drink boiled water. Lacking this knowledge, the message of the public

health change agent who lectured about killing germs was not received as intended. To adopt this practice in the eyes of the villagers would have been to admit to being sick and to go against custom which only a few women were prepared to do. The message sent was not the message received.

Three macro-variables are of fundamental importance to the communication process. One of these is the fact that different people in different circumstances at different times perceive the world around them differently. Thus, the same message isn't received the same way by everyone or even by the same people at different times. A second macro-variable resides in the nature of the language itself. Exactly the same word(s) can mean, and are used to mean, quite different things. Thus, as Middleton and Hsu Lin (1975) point out "family planning" in one context may mean planning the financial security for the parents and children in later years and in another context the same words mean the spacing of children through the use of some form of birth control. Another dimension of the language problem lies in the use of jargon or other arcane words which only the select few are able to understand. While many may have heard the three blind mice nursery rhyme who would be able to understand or recite it if it were couched in some more scientific terminology as one wit has done, as follows: "A triumvarate of murine rodents devoid of ophthalmic acuity were observed in a state of rapid locomotion in

pursuit of an agriculturalist's uxorial adjunct. Said adjunct then performed a triple caudectomy utilizing an acutely honed bladed instrument used for subdivision of edible tissue". While this is a humorous and perhaps improbable example of the use of English, the following real life examples suggest that passages like this aren't exactly unknown. Three examples quoted in A.I.D.'s Front Lines are (1) 'In the Niger River Basin, Nigeria is the only truly downstream state. The remaining eight countries are either strictly upstream countries or as in the cases of Mali, Niger and Benin, they are downstream countries and upstream to those which are downstream from them', (2) 'In view of a tight supply situation here, the ECA is not in a position to present a justifiable claim for requirements arrived at in the above manner unless the total requirements from which the residual was obtained were based on minimum essential needs and the amounts designated from other sources represent maximum availabilities', and (3) 'The project's benefit stream is a function of the social rate alternately of the opportunity shadow rate for urban consumers, surplus benefits and/or resource savings' (Agency for International Development, 1979, p. 1; 1981 p. 4.).

The communication problem inherent in the English language, is well illustrated by a quote from General John W. Vessey, Jr. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: "From my own experience, I can tell you, more has been screwed up on the battlefield and

misunderstood in the Pentagon because of a lack of understanding of the English language than any other single factor." (New York Times Magazine, 1984). As (Goldstein, 1985) points out the problem of understanding is often one of how clearly something is written. Commenting on the communication problem inherent in the use of language, (Ofshe, 1970) observes that if a system of perfect "communication could be established, it would change every aspect of society as we know it... The necessity of relying on a relatively crude medium of communication, language, it is argued, makes it impossible for anyone ever to convey his cognitions precisely to another." (Ofshe, p. 62.)

Thirdly, it makes a world of difference as to who and how the message(s) are communicated. Sex, age, and ethnicity all play a part here. The use of demonstrators, radio, newspapers, posters, formal versus informal means all make important differences in the success of the communicated message. Roy, Waisanen and Rogers (1969) report on a research project in India which showed that the use of trained villagers (animators) to communicate improved practices actually reduced the level of acceptance of agricultural and health practices as compared to the control villages.

V TIME AND COST ESTIMATES AND PREDICTIONS

It is common knowledge that projects often take more time and cost more than originally anticipated. Cost overruns are almost becoming expected for large scale projects. The magnitude of such presumably unanticipated costs may be illustrated by the $436.00 hammer. As documented in the Congressional Record of May 15,1984, the U.S. Navy paid Gould Electronics $436.00 for a hammer which retails at $7.66. Even worse was the Department of Defense purchase of a wrench for $1,150 which retails for under $5.00.

All kinds of unexpected and thus unplanned for problems arise during project implementation which result in costly time delays. In Third World situations, a major area of difficulty seems to reside in the logistics area. This is particularly true, but not limited to the transportation system. One can almost predict some sort of breakdown in the transportation system on which timely project implementation depends. Vehicles don't arrive as scheduled or they breakdown unexpectedly and can't be fixed due to lack of spare parts or competent personnel. Moris (1981) makes a convincing case that time estimates for LDC projects are usually unrealistic because project planners working

in artificial isolation ignore the realities of the system in which projects must be implemented.

In estimating time requirements for project operations some form of PERT or the Critical Path Method (CPM) is often used. Time requirements for individual project activities within the PERT system, which many project planners use, are estimated with the following formula:

$$te = \frac{a + 4m + b}{6} = \text{mean}$$

Where: te = the estimated time for an activity to be completed.

a = the most optimistic time

m = the most likely time

b = the most pessimistic time

In this formula; a, m, and b are simply the best judgments of knowledgeable persons who may have had some experience with similar projects in the past. (Oh Josiah, where art thou?)

Once all the time estimates are made for individual activities, the total time for the project can be estimated by simply adding them up. The probability of meeting the deadline for the project can then be determined by comparing the time estimates with the time which has been scheduled. This is done

by computing a Z factor which is taken to a table of probabilities. Without going into the formula for Z, it is sufficient to note that when TE (the total estimated time for the project) equals TS (the scheduled time for the project) then Z will equal zero. When zero is taken to the table of probabilities it will be observed that the probability factor is .5. What this means, then, is that you have a 50% chance of meeting your deadline for the project. The only way to increase this probability is to extend the deadline. However, when this is done, you run the risk of invoking the Peter Principle which says that, at a minimum, work expands to fill the time allotted to it and thus your cost estimates are likely to be low. (Moder et al. 1983). Probabilities above .6 suggest that you are using too many resources to achieve your your deadlines (Federal Electric Corporation, 1964).

The time estimates discussed above relate to the accomplishment of activities within projects. Of a more serious and fundamental nature are the time estimates ordinarily used for bringing about socio-economic development. The time horizon of planners, administrators and politicians is unrealistically short in terms of what is involved in affecting fundamental change in society. National plans and development projects are typically written in five year terms during which major accomplishments regarding health, education, and welfare are to take place.

However, development takes generations, not five or even ten years. Doug Ensminger at the University of Missouri has argued that a minimum of three generations are required before the societal transformations necessary for development can be expected to occur. Because we have the wrong time frame, we plan projects with unrealistically short durations which don't allow time for the changes to occur. Then we evaluate them excessively early and find that they haven't really achieved all they were supposed to.

In the Experts Speak: The Definitive Compendium of Authoritative Misinformation, Christopher Cerf and Victor Navasky, (1984) have compiled a weighty tome of estimates and predictions by knowledgeable people all of which have proven to be dead wrong. A few selections are enough to indicate that expert advice isn't always reliable and that experts characteristically disagree with each other in fundamental ways. In commenting on Edison's electric light bulb in 1879, Henry Morgan, professor of physics and president of Steven's Institute of Technology said "How can he (Thomas Alva Edison) call it a wonderful success when everyone acquainted with the subject will recognize it as a conspicuous failure?"; On atomic energy, Albert Einstein is quoted as saying "There is not the slightest indication that (nuclear) energy will ever be obtainable. It would mean that the atom would have to be shattered at will.".

Thomas Watson, Chairman of the Board of IBM, is reputed to have said "I think there is a world market for about five computers". Several "experts" echoed Lord Kelvin's remark that "heavier-than-air flying machines are impossible" (Lord Kelvin, British mathematician, physicist, and President of the British Royal Society, 1895).

The authors of this compendium of "expert misinformation, disinformation, misunderstanding, miscalculation, egregious prognostication, boo-boos and occasional just plain lies" conclude that "experts are wrong without regard to race, color, creed, sex, discipline, speciality, country, culture, or century. They are wrong about facts, they are wrong about theories, they are wrong about dates, they are wrong about geography, they are wrong about the future, they are wrong about the past, and at best they are misleading about the present, not to mention next week". However, they do not deny that experts are sometimes right. All experts are not always wrong. Perhaps they are right about half the time. (Cerf and Navasky, 1984).

VI VARIABLES

Most social and economic development projects, including community development are designed to bring about some form of change. Usually in these projects, the changes are aimed at some

form of behavioral and/or attitudinal change. These changes are in turn intended to bring about some other desired state of affairs. Farmers are asked to change their cultivation practices in order to increase their productivity which is supposed to increase their income and thus raise their level of living. Communities are advised to engage in self-help activities in order to develop their own leadership and other potentials thus becoming more self-reliant and in the process making the community a better place to live.

Among the many reasons for projects not working out as planned involves the nature of the variables we are working with and their cause and effect relationships. First of all, we are not in a position in the social sciences where we can predict with any degree of certainty what the cause and effect relationships are between any two or more variables. We are, on the other hand, very well aware of the fact that there are several variables at work at any given time all of which are interacting with each other. We often summarize this state of affairs with the statement that there is an interrelated system of variables at work each of which is having some effect on the others. This is easy to say but extremely difficult to spell out in concrete terms with any degree of specificity. What are these variables? How are they interrelated at any point in time and how do these relationships vary through time or in changed

circumstances?

It is my contention that (a) we do not know what all the variables are which cause the effects we observe in the social or economic development fields; (b) we do not know with any degree of certainty how the various variables at work are related to each other and therefore, we can't say with any degree of precision how a change in one unit of Y will cause some change in X; and finally, (c) that we do not have any control over how all these variables work. To the extent these points are true, projects will not work as planned except through sheer happenstance.

The complications involved in programs of social change are perhaps well illustrated by the diagram below prepared by a Ford Foundation team of agricultural experts.



Figure 1. The Ford Foundation team of agricultural experts emphasized that "There are no simple solutions to India's food production problems. No two or three easy steps can be taken to allay the impending crises." Of the seventy-odd factors listed by the team as components in the Indian food revolution, this diagram shows less than half; and of the interrelationships among these factors, only a part are suggested. The Ford Report stresses fertilizers and water are especially important. To make use of the former will involve (among other things) research, roads, capital, fabrication (not shown on the diagram), soil surveys, extension services to provide education, administrators, program co-ordinators, publications, etc., and substantial adjustments will have to be made to climate, soils, rainfall, etc. If these factors are ignored or neglected the potential value of the fertilizers will be reduced to a greater or lesser degree. Without more water available when it is needed, to take an especially important example, fertilizers will help relatively little and will come at a much higher cost, et cetera!

This diagram partially depicts the variables involved in raising food production in India. According to the Foundation's experts, there are over seventy variables related to increasing food production in India. Only about half of these are shown in the diagram and only a part of the interrelationships among these are suggested! This serves to illustrate the complexity of the systems approach which we are fond of proclaiming in the social sciences. Until we can diagram the social system we are attempting to change and give the different variables the differential weights they deserve, and then show how each is related to the others, we will not be in a position to guide the process of social change to achieve what we set out to achieve with any degree of certainty. However, one thing does appear fairly certain: just like the ad for potato chips which says:"I bet you can't eat just one"; in the field of social change, you can't change just one thing.

An important insight concerning the magnitude of the problems we are facing in attempting to understand and organize the process of social change is provided in the Encyclopedia of World Problems and Human Potential, 1986. This encyclopedia is a source book of over 4,500 world problems with their perceived interconnections and the "human resources available to analyze, challenge and ultimately solve them"! It contains a clarification

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of over 1,000 human values; 250 human development concepts; descriptions of more than 1,800 relevant intellectual disciplines and sciences; a compendium of social transformation strategies and processes; a listing of 24,000 international organizations and networks; a list of related occupations and roles; and 50,000 cross references linking entries to conceptual sections and to the human values violated by the problem. When one considers the complexity of these issues and then realizes that each individual on the earth only represents two one-hundred millionths of one percent of the world's population it is easy to see how feeble our efforts are in controlling the variables which are operating to produce the realities which we experience (not to mention that these realities are different for different people!).

One is tempted to say that the answer to our understanding and control is research - more and better research! Although few would argue against this position it is instructive to note that the Coca Cola company engaged in four and- a- half years of research before it decided to change its formula. Within two weeks of marketing its new formula it had to retreat back to the original formulation. Meadows et al.(1974) spent an enormous amount of time analyzing a multitude of variables related to five major trends of global concern. Suffice it to say that other professionals have taken the analytical model to task and that the authors themselves have characterized it as imperfect,

oversimplified, and unfinished.

In spite of the immensities involved in ordering the universe or its subparts, the American attitude appears undaunted. The current American attitude toward change and our capacity to control it is perhaps epitomized by a statement by the Congressional Clearinghouse On The Future in which these members of Congress say that they "believe that they, and others, have the responsibility to shape and choose the future" (Congressional Clearinghouse on The Future and The Congressional Institute for The Future). It is hoped that this paper will illuminate the fatuously arrogant presumption that the U.S. Congress or anyone else can determine the future.

A more realistic attitude toward our problems and our capacity to solve them may be illustrated with a comment by Martin Anderson, former domestic-policy advisor to President Reagan concerning a proposal to revamp the welfare program: "To start a new national program, in view of how little we know, would be irresponsible." (U.S. News and World Report, June 30, 1986).

VII CORRUPTION

Projects may be corrupted in several different ways. The most common use of this term refers to a dishonest use or

misdirection of project funds or other resources for personal gain. When this form of malfeasance occurs, it is fairly obvious that projects will suffer and be unable to obtain their planned results. The extent of this form of corruption is not clear but there are enough scandals brought to light to suggest that this may be a fairly important explanation for the failure of some projects.

Nonfeasance and misfeasance are two other forms of corruption which occur when project administrators or other personnel do not carry out the activities for which funds are made available or when these funds are used to achieve purposes which are different than those for which funds were budgeted. There are many reasons for these forms of corruption among which is the separation of project planners from project implementors. When government funded projects prohibit the planners from bidding on the implementation to avoid a conflict of interest, then the probability of the project not being implemented as planned is increased. One of the hallmarks of a professional is to be able to make independent analyses and conclusions from a data set. Unfortunately, or fortunately, depending on how you look at it, professionals in most fields of endeavor tend to disagree with each other concerning the meaning of the same data and oftentimes argue that the data on which conclusions were drawn were insufficient or wrong. Because of this, professionals

who implement plans will often change them based on their own "superior" wisdom. When this happens, it is obviously difficult for the original objectives to be achieved as planned.

Wholey (1979), Rutman (1980), and others within the professional evaluation community have commented on the lack of program delivery. This form of corruption is sufficiently widespread that they have introduced the concept of program evaluability along with a set of procedures to determine, inter alia, if the program was actually delivered before engaging in its evaluation. It should be pointed out, that there are some programs which are impossible to implement as planned due to the poor nature of the planning and thus the fault lies not with the implementors, but with the planners.

VIII PROBABILITIES

Given the rather high degree of uncertainty concerning the variables we are working with and how they interact with each other we will always be working with unkown probabilities and can never be certain of what will happen once a project is started. In the Ford Foundation example above, some seventy variables were suggested as being related to increasing food production in India. If one were to assign probability factors to each of these and then compute the overall probability for a project working as

planned it would soon become apparent that the cards are stacked against you. According to probability theory, the probability of more than one event occuring when each event is independent of the other is determined by the product of the individual probabilities. Thus, if two independent events each have a probability of .9; then the probability of both of them occurring is .9 X .9 = .81. A probability of .9 is quite high, but a simple calculation shows that when only seven variables are involved, each with a probability of .9 that the chance of all of them occuring is .48 or less than half the time. If three more are added to round it out at ten; the probability of all ten taking place is just over one-third (35%). If only one of these ten had a probability of .7, then the overall probability would be just over one-fourth (27%). On the other hand, if the probabilities of each variable could be increased nearer to certainty, say .95 for each, then by time we have 14 variables operating the probability that they will all occur will have fallen to under half (49%). If only one of these 14 variables were to have a probability of .7 then the overall probability would be around two-fifths (42%). But if one were to be increased to .99, then with the 14 variables, the overall probability would still only be just over half at 51%. Because most projects usually have more than a dozen or so variables operating and because their probabilities and degree of independence are only vaguely known,

the probability of things working as planned is very low. Richard Ofshe has reminded us that all scientific predictions assume that all conditions will remain constant but that this assumption isn't always made explicit. If we could enumerate all the independent causal variables involved in a prediction about a social process, the prediction would be extremely low. "If as few as ten important variables each had a probability of changing only .1, then the probability of the prediction proving correct would be 9 . It hardly seems worth the effort to state a prediction that has only this probability of being correct." (Ofshe, 1970, p. 256). When one looks at the high percentage of new businesses, especially small enterprises, which fail, then the cogency of probabilities strikes home. About two-thirds of all retail establishments fail to survive for more than five years (Stern,1986).

IX EVALUATION AND MEASUREMENT

In commenting on the conclusions of the Coleman report concerning the marginal influence of schooling on educational achievement (Guba, 1972) has raised serious questions concerning our capacity to design instruments which will in fact measure the outcomes of social programs. He says that empirical research evidence often contradicts the experiential evidence of

practitioners. Research instruments fail to affirm what practitioners and clients say is happening. We know, he asserts, that the ineffectiveness of the school system as reported by Coleman's research is simply not true. Clinical evidence that evaluation is unable to measure outputs adequately, he says, is available from several sources: (1) planners and administrators fail to include it in their programs, and avoid funding it whenever possible (2) practitioners become very anxious when evaluations are conducted (3) meaningful and operational guidelines for evaluation usually don't exist (4) most evaluation designs are deficient and (5) over and over, evaluation reports find no significant difference between the treatment group and the control group. (Guba, 1972). In a study of federally funded evaluations by Berstein and Freeman, it was concluded that "about half the studies that measure impact were deficient either in design, sampling, or validity of meaning." (Rutman, 1980, p. 32).

Berk and Rossi indicate that most applied social research professionals are more proficient in studying individual behavior than they are at studying social organizations. They can report on statistical collectivities of individuals but can't say much about the social systems which might be causing the observed behavior. Evaluation research designs tend to follow program designs which treat individuals and social units as independent units subject to change without any effects from or on the social

system of which they are a part. This flies in the face of systems theory which most social scientists, including the researchers, adhere to.

In spite of these weaknesses in evaluation research, program administrators and other readers of evaluation studies often turn to the evaluators for advice on what to do to correct the problems which have been uncovered. This is the "you found a problem; now give-me-a-solution syndrome. It is considered a weakness to reply that this is not my job or to make some other excuse for not coming up with an answer, so most evaluators wade in where they have no business. Evaluation studies observe what did or did not happen. They make no observations of what might have happened or what could happen. They do not study the causes that would produce better results. Therefore, evaluators have no particular expertise in designing new programs. For this reason, it is perhaps valuable that most evaluation reports aren't used for redesigning projects.

It's just possible then, that evaluation, like other projects, doesn't work as planned! To the extent this is true then perhaps we don't really know whether things are working or not or the degree to which they may or may not be working. It is just possible that even though programs don't achieve their intended effects that they have much more substantial effects on the lives of the people associated with them which although not

intended and not measured are nevertheless real and which may become evident years from now (Moynihan, 1968).

X BUREAUCRATIZATION AND GOAL DISPLACEMENT

There are literally dozens, if not hundreds, of books and articles dealing with the propensity of organizations to substitute means for ends and to turn inward and/or upward in their efforts to survive. Although the term bureaucracy usually carries an image of large scale public agencies the process of bureaucratization is not limited to this arena. Private organizations in the profit and non-profit sectors may also be bureaucratized. We ordinarily think of large scale organizations with a high proportion of professional employees as being the most susceptible to this process. Studies have shown however, that small scale organizations and those comprised of volunteers may also be bureaucratized.

As everyone knows, the first rule of organizational behavior is survival. Once this is accepted, then the organization must behave in whatever way is required to achieve this purpose. The individuals within the organization become secondary and the clientele (the original purpose for existence for public and voluntary organizations) becomes tertiary. The requirements for existence are first and foremost to satisfy the power structure

which has control over the funding, if not the actual existence, of the organization. To do this, the agency or organization has to develop a good reputation and as Stanton (1970) asserts, it must project a positive image or impression that it is performing well and achieving its objectives. It is important to remember that for agencies dealing with socio-economic change or welfare, the buyer (funder) and the consumer (clientele) are not only different but far removed in physical, psychological and socio-economic distance. This "situation presents a sizeable problem: to achieve its professed goals, the agency must serve the consumer; but to survive, it need only please the donor. Theoretically therefore, by controlling negative feedback, the organization can substitute packaging for product. With the elimination of constraints, image manipulation may be substituted for goal directed action". (Stanton, 1970, p. 27).

Selznick and other observers of the bureaucratic scene discuss goal displacement in terms of the personnel becoming more interested in their own personal security and welfare than they are about the organization's goals. All formal organizations contain an informal structure which arises spontaneously based on personality and power relationships. This informal structure acts to control the processes within the organization for the benefit of its members and this acts to change the goals of the organization (Selznick, 1943). When functionaries give emphasis

to procedural matters over and above the substantive purpose of the organization, the classical case of means over ends prevails and goal displacement is in full force.

One other consequence of the bureaucratic mode needs to be mentioned because of its pervasive and insidious influence on organizations and the design and implementation of projects. This is the overwhelming desire to measure and quantify the outputs. Fed strongly by the desire to be accountable for the expenditure of funds, agencies and organizations are moving rapidly toward what (Geertz,1984) has termed 'quantophrenia' in which qualitative or soft data are quantified. The results of this orientation is that those aspects of life which are measurable in quantifiable terms are given emphasis over the nonmeasurable dimensions (Etzioni, 1964). "Outcomes that can be counted easily tend to be listed as the outcomes desired" and these are the goals which are measured in evaluation studies (Berk and Rossi, 1976). When this happens in projects, then we are back to the problem of not dealing with a full deck of cards but unfortunately, we don't know which ones are missing. Related to this is the bureaucratic restrictions on the use of funds. Funds are usually made available in advance of project implementation for certain expenditures only. This restriction presupposes full knowledge of the problem and its solution. It also reinforces the notion that change can be made piecemeal and in isolation

from the social system within which the problem-to-be-solved exists.

SUMMARY

In summary, projects don't work as planned because the data base on which they are planned and which is used to define problems and solutions is inadequate; assumptions about human behavior and especially the project's clientele are not necessarily valid; externalities have an indeterminable influence on project operations; the communication process is often weak and subject to varying degrees of misunderstanding; the time and cost estimates and predictions are subject to large errors and unanticipated changes; cause and effect variables and not fully understood or controllable; there is an unknown degree of corruption operating with regard to project operations and the use of available funds; the probabilities of all necessary events taking place properly within the required time sequence is low; our capacity to evaluate project outcomes is weak; and the agencies responsible for projects tend to become bureaucratized which leads to goal displacement.

In view of these difficulties and the history of failed efforts one should, to "coin" a phrase: ask not why things don't work but ask why things work as well as they do or why they work

at all. Given this state of affairs a legitimate question is how does one explain the fact that there are successful projects? The second section of this paper identifies the major variables which are related to successful project implementation. However, one needs to keep in mind that what is called successful isn't necessarily what was planned and thus successful projects may also fall into the category of projects which don't work as planned. It is commonplace to talk about the unanticipated consequences of projects. These consequences are often discussed in terms of the negative ones, but they can also be positive in nature.

"SOLUTIONS"

The position expressed above regarding our ability to identify and control the variables affecting projects might be summarized by saying that the reason projects don't work as planned is because we are not God. In more mundane terms it is because of Murphy's Law which says: whatever can possibly go wrong will and that if several things can go wrong, the one that causes the most damage will be the one to go wrong.

The pitfalls identified above merely indicate some of the reasons why Murphy was right. In this section, the term "solutions" is put in quotations because there really aren't any solutions. We would just like to think there are. We would like nothing better than a formula which could be applied which would, as if by magic, solve all these difficulties and make things work out as we planned them. As H.L. Menken has said: for every difficult, complex problem there is a simple and easy solution- and it's always wrong! Although formulas don't exist, it is possible to review the literature and report on some research

findings which seem to suggest some approaches to project planning and implementation which if used should serve to improve our chances of obtaining positive results.

THE LITERATURE

Much of what will be presented here relies on the following authors who, in large part, seem to agree with each other and who have come to their positions as a result of studying a number of projects around the world. (Korten, 1980); (Paul, 1982, 1983); (Development Alternatives, 1975); (Moris, 1981); (The World Bank, 1983); (Coombs, 1980); (Fortin and Stiefel, 1985); (Shanner W.W. et al., 1982); (Ensminger, 1977); (Ford Foundation, 1981); and (Dasgupta, 1967). In addition to these sources, some of my own ideas are presented and identified when these aren't backed by research.

THE RECOMMENDATIONS

The recommended principles and practices listed below are classified into a number of categories but are not presented in any order of importance or priority. Each one of these is important in its own right and each is necessary, but none of

them alone is sufficient.

Research

The farming systems approach is giving important attention to knowing what the local conditions are before engaging in recommendations for change. Taken a step further, it is necessary to understand as much as possible about a local situation before attempting to organize a change program. This is fairly obvious to development practitioners but is usually observed in the breach. It is also important that in conducting the necessary research that the local inhabitants of the program communities be involved through a participatory process in what today is called participatory research. The object of the research should be to describe the social system in sufficient detail that the cause and effect linkages which have produced the problem(s) can be identified.

Problem identification should come out of the study rather than being predetermined by social change agents with programs to sell. It should be clear by now that when health professionals visit a community they see health problems and when agricultural professionals visit they see agricultural problems just as educators see educational problems. This specialization is a function of our educational system in which knowledge has been

divided and compartmentalized into departments each of which has its own language and world view. The advantage of specialization is the contribution it makes to our knowledge about the subject matter under study. The disadvantage is that the analytical process proceeds by dissecting the subject matter into ever diminishing pieces which it fails to recombine and relate to the totality of the system of which it is a part. Because there is no synthesis the individual parts take on lives of their own and become all important. This leads directly to the predetermination of problems without the need for research.

Properly performed, the research would not only identify the problems in a cause and effect manner but would also show the relationships of one problem to the other. Since life is lived holistically and within a system of interdependent parts the research should result in a matrix of problems and provide an action agenda with a timetable showing the order in which the problems should be addressed. It should also indicate who the actors are who need to be involved, including the identification of the proper clientele. An estimate of the opposing forces should be made with proposals suggesting how to overcome the opposition. The research would also identify local and outside resources which can be brought to bear on the problems identified and indicate the necessary inputs for addressing the problems in conformity with the projected timetable. Simply put, do the best

job possible to understand the local situation so you improve your predictions about what will happen if the program is implemented. If simulation models can be constructed properly, they should be used.

Geert (1983) has distinguished between convergent and divergent data. The description of a community social system in terms of how it operates holistically and how the individual personalities relate to each other as human beings within the social structure is particularistic and convergent. Divergent data tends to be statistical in nature in which people are put into categories and classes within which they don't relate to each other in any meaningful way such as all women, all rice growers, all school leavers, etc. Data of this type are ordinarily collected through surveys, polls, questionnaires, censuses etc. and are used to make generalizations about statistical classes. Samples are frequently used along with procedures for error estimation and tests of significance. In the best of all worlds, community research, especially for large communities, should use both types of research. However, the convergent data collected through participant observation and other ethnographic techniques is essential in understanding how a community operates. The unwary must also be cautioned in using aggregate statistical data that they don't make the rather easy mistake of assuming that the correlations obtained will pertain

to the individuals within the statistical class. This is Robinson's famous ecological correlation in which he showed that there is no relationship between correlations based on grouped data and correlations based on individual data. For example, one cannot correlate job training and unemployment rates and conclude that job training has had an effect on employment unless employment data are available on the job trainees as individuals (Robinson, 1950). But more important than the type of data collected is the data collectors. Community research should as far as possible be conducted by the residents themselves with the aid of research professionals who can provide the necessary guidance in collection and analysis.

Participation

Just about all observers agencies, researchers and development specialists today recognize the importance of participation of the local people in the development process. However, few of them understand the extent to which people need to be involved and few agencies can be found which implement their own rhetoric. To be effective, participation needs to take place initially at the policy level. Although a huge amount of literature is produced on poverty and race relations in the U.S. very little of this is produced by blacks or the ethnic

minorities. Much of what is written and purported as what we "know" in the social sciences is produced by whites of which about two thirds are either Jews or Catholics. The policy makers who conceived the poverty program and those who administered it knew very little about black poverty. No blacks were involved in any significant way in the planning of the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and the same was essentially true of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders which was basically the work of white social scientists (Moynihan, 1968). It should also be noted that very few women were (or are) involved at the policy or any other official or professional level either. The inclusion of women and minorities in the decision-making process is crucial because of the perspective they bring and because of the degree to which they are involved in the problem situations which most development programs address.

Other levels where participation is required include all aspects of project design, implementation and evaluation. As noted above, it should include the initial research which identifies how the system works and what the problems are which need to be addressed. This is more than a simple needs assessment. It is a needs assessment plus the establishment of cause. Further, the participation needs to be active and meaningful rather then passive. This means that the program beneficiaries need to not only be involved in decision-making but

must commit some of their own economic and other resources to the program. It also means that agency personnel must be prepared to listen to community initiatives and not approach the community with set ideas of what the problems and solutions are. When the impetus for change comes from within the community and the community asks an agency for assistance there is a better chance for success than if the agency brings a program in and tries to convince the community that it has a problem.

Communication

To avoid the problems of misunderstanding, a number of simple rules should be observed. First is the use of simple words which the majority of people understand. In attempting to reach the people, however, it is best not to use colloquialisms or slang words which may be "in words" for one section of the population but not for other sections. Second, to reduce the problems of interpretation, use words which have concrete versus abstract meaning. A third rule is to use the same word as often as possible to convey the intended meaning. Using synonyms is an acceptable practice as long as the meaning is the same. Unfortunately, in the process of avoiding the boredom of repetition, the use of a different word can change to entire meaning. As Orwell, (1961, p. 366) advises, "let the meaning

choose the word, and not the other way about". Following these rules may reduce the literary value of the written word, but development projects aren't literary events and project documents aren't intended to be literary masterpieces.

A fourth rule, usually observed in the breach, is to pre-test your messages. Although this rule is most applicable to messages intended to convey information to a client population, it is also essential in survey research and very useful for testing clarity of any document before it is finalized. Asking one or more neutral observers to read and react to what you have written to see if the intended message is clear will prove to be very effective and efficient. Smith, (1980) reports on a pretesting service which is available in the U.S. He indicates that he is working on developing countries applications for pre-program testing of messages. A fifth rule relates to special terms or abstract words. If such words must be used, be sure to define them clearly according to the way you intend them to be understood. Operational definitions are very useful for this purpose. In so far as possible, avoid emotionally loaded words which tend to incite strong passions, biases or stereotypical responses.

From the welter of books and guidelines for good communication, one would not go far wrong by adhering to the six rules of George Orwell (1961):

1. Never use a metaphor, simile or other figure of speech which you are used to seeing in print.
2. Never use a long word where a short one will do.
3. If it is possible to cut a word out, always cut it out.
4. Never use the passive where you can use the active.
5. Never use a foreign phrase, a scientific word or jargon word if you can think of an everyday ... equivalent
6. Break any of these rules sooner than say anything outright barbarous.

All these rules apply to good writing and good speech within any language. On a cross-cultural basis, whether international where different languages are involved, or within a country where different sub-cultures are involved, there is an added dimension. One must be certain that the words, concepts, etc. employed mean the same thing in one language or culture as they do in another. Translations need to be thoroughly checked with representatives of the cultures involved to be sure that the intended meaning is actually being sent.

Education and Training

It is my own view that education and training should be

provided for all beneficiaries and project personnel on a continuing basis. Training programs need to be devised which initially will assist citizens in participating in the original research on the community. This will involve data collection and analysis. Providing information on where resources are is another important training area. The staff needs training in participatory research techniques and how to work with people at the community level. Training should be conducted which provides farmers and extension staff the most relevant, up to-date, information at the most opportune time for it to be used in the decision-making processes. In fact, one could view the entire development process as one of education and training in which the objectives would be to enable the citizenry to obtain the knowledge and skills necessary for the resolution of local problems.

Bureaucratic Organization

Because individuals and communities are particularistic and differ from each other in important ways, programs involving local communities need to be implemented on a decentralized basis. Decision-making regarding project matters needs to be as close to the scene of action as possible. The project leader needs to have control over the project with as much autonomy as

feasible. Project personnel need to be in the community as much as possible and need to establish open communication channels with the citizens. Project managers need to have control over who is assigned and who will remain on the project.

Most public agencies involved in development work use some form of bidding for the planning and/or implementation of projects. This results in a different set of implementors than planners. Once project plans are approved a search is made for a good administrator or manager to implement the plan. A stronger and preferred approach is to identify good leaders or managers and give them the authority to develop their own project -in cooperation with the people, as proposed above. The project manager under this arrangement has a direct line of responsibility to the people in the community as well as being responsible to higher officials for the administration of funds.

The Learning Process Approach

Korten (1980) has made a cogent analysis of a number of successful development projects in Asia. His conclusions, suggestions, and the conceptual framework he provides parallel the findings and recommendations of several other observers.

The main recommendations emanating from these works include the following:

- Projects require strong local leadership. It is important to work through local leaders who are honest and who have the interest of the community and its disadvantaged members at heart.

- Projects require constant contact between the staff and the community members or other clientele group.

- Projects must have a people centered emphasis.

- It is necessary to build local organizations which can take responsibility for the project.

- A good feed-back loop which provides up to-date information in a monitoring sense is essential. This information should go to the staff and the local people.

- Development assistance programs must be part of a holistically perceived learning process; not a bureaucratically designed and mandated blue print. Programs can't be designed and implemented like an architect might design and build a building. Programs have to emerge as you go along and be constantly adjusted and

readjusted depending on the feed back received. It's more like the process Edison used in inventing the incandescent light when he kept trying different materials until he finally found one that worked.

- The bureaucratic structure within which projects operate must be a learning organization which can recognize and learn from its mistakes without defining a project a failure when it doesn't succeed immediately in reaching its desired objectives.

- Start small and learn to be effective before taking on larger projects or expanding to other areas.

- Use an integrated, interdisciplinary approach in which problems are viewed holistically and where the people and staff from all technical and administrative offices work together cooperatively. (I make a distinction between integrated and comprehensive. Comprehensive implies working on all problems at once which is usually impossible. The integrated approach sorts out through research, as recommended above, the major problems in order of priority and their interrelationships. Once the interrelationships and consequences of changing one part

of the system are traced out, the program makes provision for the dislocations and other effects, positive or negative, which the proposed change entails).

A Development Philosophy

An overall philosophy of development is essential for formulating project objectives and governing the decision-making process. There is perhaps no better way to conclude this paper than with a quote from Julius Nyerere's philosophy which if practiced along with the specific recommendations listed above would go a long way toward resolving the development problems we all face. It is assumed, although not stated by him, that the use of the word "man", includes women.

> "For the truth is that development means the development of people. Roads, buildings, the increases in crop output, and other things of this nature are not development; they are only the tools of development...Development brings freedom, provided it is of people. But people cannot be developed, they can only develop themselves. For while it is possible for an outsider to build a man's house, an outsider cannot give the man pride and self-confidence in himself as a human being. Those things a man has to create in himself by his own actions. He develops himself by what he does; he develops himself by making his own decisions, by increasing his understanding of what he is doing, and why; by increasing his knowledge and ability, and by his own full participation --as an equal --in the life of the community he lives in. Thus, for example a man is developing himself when he grows, or earns enough to provide decent conditions for himself and his family; he is not being developed if someone gives him these

things. A man is developing when he improves his education--whatever he learns about; he is not being developed if he simply carries out orders from someone better educated than himself without understanding why these orders have been given. A man develops himself by joining in free discussion of a new venture, and participating in the subsequent decision; he is not being developed if he is herded like an animal into the new venture. Development of a man can, in fact, only be effected by that man; development of the people can only be effected by the people.

There is only one way in which you can cause people to undertake their own development. That is by education and leadership. Through these means--and no other--people can be helped to understand both their needs, and the things which they can do to satisfy these needs.

Finally, if development is to increase people's freedom, it must be development for the people. It must serve them, and their interests. Every proposal must be judged by the criterion of whether it serves the purpose of development--and the purpose of development is people. Yet if a proposal contributes to the development of people, and if it is being carried out by the people of their own free will, it will automatically be for the people's interests, provided three conditions are fulfilled. First, if the people understand their own needs; second, if they understand how these needs can be met; and third, if they have the freedom to make their own decisions and to carry them into effect." (Nyerere, 1975).

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